

A family of 6-to-4-bit S-boxes with large linear branch number


Daniel Loebenberger Michael Nüsken

Bonn-Aachen International Center for Information Technology



YACC 2014, 11 June 2014



From DES to DESL+





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

DES round function

From DES to DESL+



DESL round function
Leander, Paar, Poschmann & Schramm (2007)

From DES to DESL+



DESL+ round function

$efgh$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
$U(0efgh0)$	0	9	7	2	B	E	C	5	3	F	D	8	4	1	A	6
$U(0efgh1)$	B	6	8	F	2	1	5	C	D	A	E	3	7	4	0	9
$U(1efgh0)$	E	4	8	D	2	7	1	B	5	A	6	3	9	C	F	0
$U(1efgh1)$	1	D	4	2	F	8	A	7	6	0	9	5	C	B	3	E

Preliminaries

Properties

Applications to DESL

Summary

Preliminaries

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Applications to DESL

Summary

S-boxes: Differential probabilities and bias

Consider an S-box $S: \mathbb{F}_2^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.

Definition (Differential probability)

$$\begin{aligned}\text{diff}_S(\Delta x \rightarrow \Delta y) &= \text{prob}(S(X) \oplus S(X \oplus \Delta x) = \Delta y) \\ &= \frac{1}{2^k} \# \left\{ x \in \mathbb{F}_2^k \mid S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta x) = \Delta y \right\} \\ &\in [0, 1]\end{aligned}$$

Definition (Bias)

$$\begin{aligned}\text{bias}_S(a, b) &= \text{prob}(\langle a | X \rangle = \langle b | S(X) \rangle) - \text{prob}(\langle a | X \rangle \neq \langle b | S(X) \rangle) \\ &= \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^k} (-1)^{\langle a | x \rangle} (-1)^{\langle b | S(x) \rangle} \\ &\in [-1, 1]\end{aligned}$$

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
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How to find an S-box

- ▶ There are $2^{4 \cdot 2^6} = 2^{256}$ S-boxes mapping 6 bits to 4 bits.
- ▶ Most of them are not suitable for cryptographic purposes.

Techniques:



- ▶ Start with a void S-box.
- ▶ Add values depth first like.
- ▶ Incrementally compute differential and bias table (afap).
 - ▶ Diff: 0, +1 or +2. (few)
 - ▶ Bias: -1 or +1. (all)
- ▶ Purge subtree if node is too bad.
- ▶ Optional: sort children by penalty.
- ▶ Use isomorphisms:
49 152 members in the family.


Still, there are roughly $10^{14} \approx 2^{47}$ nodes to traverse!

Split into manageable tasks, by cutting the tree at a certain level.
We used level 18, leading to 937 140 subtrees to consider.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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For purging,

- ▶ in early runs: properties (on diff and bias) by Leander, Paar, Poschmann & Schramm (2007) with some relaxations,
- ▶ in later runs: our own properties.

Preliminaries

Properties

Applications to DESL

Summary

Linear properties

Q2⁺ $|\text{bias}_S(a, b)| \leq \frac{24}{64}$ for $a \neq 0$.

Q3⁺ $\text{bias}_S\left(\frac{\text{wt } 1}{\text{wt } 1}, \frac{\text{wt } 1}{\text{wt } 1}\right) = 0$.

Q4⁺ $|\text{bias}_S\left(\frac{\text{wt } k}{\text{wt } \ell}, \frac{\text{wt } \ell}{\text{wt } k}\right)| \leq \frac{16}{64}$
when $0 < k + \ell \leq 4$.

Q5⁻ $|\text{bias}_S(a, b_1) \cdot \text{bias}_S(a, b_2)| \leq \frac{384}{64^2}$
for all $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^6$, $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{F}_2^4$
with $\text{wt}(b_1 + b_2) = 1$.

\Rightarrow Due to Q3⁺,
if $\text{wt}(a) + \text{wt}(b) < 3$
then $\text{bias}_S(a, b) = 0$,
i.e. $\text{linbranch}(U) = 3$.

$a \setminus b$	000000	0001	0010	0100	1000	00011	0101	0110	10000	1100	0111	1011	1100	1110	1111
000000	64														
000001															
000010															
000100															
001000															
010000															
000000															
000011															
000101															
001010															
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Table : $2^6 \cdot \text{bias}_U(a, b)$

Definition

An *algebraic relation* is a polynomial $p \in \mathbb{F}_2[x, y] \setminus \{0\}$ such that $p(x, S(x)) = 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$.

- ▶ Minimal number of independent algebraic relations:

$$\text{dimrel}(U) = [0, 0, 0, 112, 322, \dots].$$

- ▶ Thus, optimal graph algebraic immunity

$$AI_{\text{graph}}(U) = 3.$$

- ▶ Due to Siegenthaler's inequality optimal multivariate degree

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Comparison

Property	Optimal	U	DES1	DES2	DES3	DES4	DES5	DES6	DES7	DES8
diffbranch	2?	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
linbranch	3?	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
AI_{graph}	3	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	3
AI_{comp}	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	5	5	4

Preliminaries

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Summary

Assumption

Round-keys and thus the bias of different rounds are independent.

⇒ No assumption on independence of the bias of adjacent S-boxes!

Approximations of the DES(L) round function

Lemma

Given $E: \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell_1} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell_2}$ injective, linear; $F: \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell_2} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell_3}$ arbitrary. Then

$$\text{bias}_{F \circ E}(a, b) = \sum_{E^\vee d = a} \text{bias}_F(d, b).$$

Corollary

For the DES round function $F_k = P \circ S^8 \circ \Sigma_k \circ E$ we have

$$\text{bias}_{F_k}(a, b) = \sum_{E^\vee d = a} (-1)^{\langle d | k \rangle} \prod_i \text{bias}_{S_i}(d_i, (P^{-1}b)_i).$$

Lemma (Patching)

Assume that there are 2^ℓ selectors d with $E^\vee d = a$ and assume $|\text{bias}_{S_i}(d_i, b_i)| \leq \varepsilon_i$. Then $|\text{bias}_{F_k}(a, b)| \leq 2^\ell \prod_i \varepsilon_i$.

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Conjecture

With S-box U , there is no relevant linear approximation.

Theorem

With S-box U , there is no relevant iterative approximation with at most ten active S-boxes.

- ▶ Problem: Bounds from the patching lemma are too weak.
- ▶ Complete proof: run a dedicated computer program.
(111 CPU days / Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU 3.00GHz.)

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Preliminaries

Properties

Applications to DESL

Summary

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- ▶ Algebraic properties better than before.
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The end.

Thank you!

$efgh$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
$U(0efgh0)$	0	9	7	2	B	E	C	5	3	F	D	8	4	1	A	6
$U(0efgh1)$	B	6	8	F	2	1	5	C	D	A	E	3	7	4	0	9
$U(1efgh0)$	E	4	8	D	2	7	1	B	5	A	6	3	9	C	F	0
$U(1efgh1)$	1	D	4	2	F	8	A	7	6	0	9	5	C	B	3	E